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Abstract
This article analyzes episodes of violence and disorder, including deaths, related to soccer in 
Argentina, as identified in the online written press between 2006 and 2017. The aim is to present 
a sample of cases in order to reflect the domestic atmosphere of violence around the Argentinean 
game. Just as Eduardo Archetti and Amílcar Romero presented figures on violence between the 
1950s and the 1980s, so our analysis explores a new type of violence, including killings by peers of 
the same supporter squad. Although the mass media, and public responses, tend to blame groups 
known as barras-bravas, we try to unpack different scenarios and assess the variety of interests 
and actors involved, which include “arrangements” with police and other authorities, as well as 
the aggression amongst the protagonists of the game itself. Consequently, we hope to update 
recent debates by revealing new trends and suggesting hypotheses for new research and public 
policies.
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Introduction
Understanding the multiple dimensions of violence in relation to soccer (or football) can 
be a complex task. Up to November 2017, the list of identified serious casualties accu-
mulated in Argentina amounted to 322 cases (http://salvemosalfutbol.org/). The victims 
reported since 1922 resulted in an average of three fatalities per year. The period between 
1958 and 1983 gave an annual average of five such “tragedies” (Archetti and Romero, 
1994). Furthermore, the yearly average of nine fan deaths during the last ten years is 
higher than the so-called “golden age” of hooliganism in England, where the estimate 
was six fan deaths a year, from 1974 to 1989 (Hobbs and Robin, 1991: 553). This consti-
tutes one important reason to continue studying this subject at present.
The problem of violence in the world of soccer has been the subject of much research. 
In Europe, the research goes back several decades as social scientists have sought to 
interpret hooliganism (Armstrong and Harry, 1991; Braun and Vliegenthart, 2008; 
Comeron, 2002; Dunning et al., 1986, 1991; Ehremberg, 1991; Giulianotti et al., 1994; 
Hobbs and Robin, 1991; Ingham, 1978; Marsh, 1978; Mignon, 1998; Murphy et al., 
1990; Readhead, 1991; Spaiij, 2006; Taylor, 1971; Walgrave and Limbergen, 1998; 
Williams et al., 1984; among others).
In Argentina, the work of the sociologist Amílcar Romero (1985, 1986, 1994) has 
been pioneering in analyzing violence in relation to soccer for the period between 1958 
and 1983. Football (fútbol) is one of the main components of the national identity of 
Argentina (Archetti, 1999), moving crowds and attracting political attention since the 
early 20th century (Duke and Crolley, 2001; Frydemberg, 2012; Levinsky, 2016; 
Palomino and Scher, 1988). Soccer (the international term) is home to one of the most 
creative choreographies and supporter cultures in Argentina, but violence and even 
deaths have, however periodically, impacted the sporting landscape. The anthropologist 
Archetti, together with Romero (1994: 39), has stressed that the junction of violence and 
death reflects social processes beyond the limits of soccer. Their analysis, which consti-
tuted the basis for ulterior research in the social sciences in Argentina, detailed: “blind” 
police repression; violence among organized fan groups; the fate of innocent victims; 
impunity; and relationships with institutional power.
The picture has not changed during the last decades of the 20th century and the begin-
ning of the new Millennium. This situation has led to several social research projects and 
political measures, which have been intended to address the problem (Garriga, 2013; 
Godio and Uliana, 2016; Sustas, 2013). On the one hand, the sheer number of studies has 
proven the role of violence for identity construction and as a resource to negotiate inter-
ests (Alabarces, 2013). On the other hand, public responses have narrowly reinforced the 
paradigm of security (Uliana and Godio, 2013). Nevertheless, institutional diagnoses 
have largely omitted analysis regarding the precarious conditions occurring in host 
matches, and the arrangements and confrontations stimulated by the security forces 
(Aragón, 2017; Sain and Rodríguez, 2014).
Although aggressions can hardly be measured according to the information based 
only on soccer and we have no exact definition of violence, we need to add here that 
there is neither an official observatory, nor available information from any entity of the 
national state related to this problem in Argentina. Official data for 2016 reported that, 
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on average, seven people were killed per day due to crime (Dirección Nacional de 
Información Operacional y Mapa del Delito (DNIOMD), Censo de crímenes y homi-
cidios, 2016). Therefore, the rate of nine annual deaths associated with soccer may rep-
resent a comparatively small number. But if we think of this sport as a public spectacle, 
it would be difficult not to compare these figures negatively with other types of entertain-
ment, whether sportive, musical, or any other leisure activity.
The only (online) information on such incidents comes from efforts made by the non-
governmental organization (NGO), Salvemos al Fútbol (Salvemos), which continued the 
work of Amílcar Romero. In 2006, this NGO came to life with the objective of denouncing 
violence, something that had been personally experienced by its founder, Mónica Nizzardo 
(Nizzardo and Bergés, 2015). In 2004, the headquarters of Atlanta (3rd Division) had been 
visited by one of the leaders of the local barra, that is, the club’s “radical” organized group 
of supporters. In his “protocol” visit, the leader asked to see the club president. Not getting 
the response he wanted, this individual then destroyed computers and smashed windows 
with an iron rod. The case went to trial and the justice exempted him, arguing that there 
were no grounds for giving him a sentence. To counter the threats, the founder of Salvemos 
made several media appearances, after which she received calls from relatives of victims, 
in particular from another woman, Liliana Suárez, founder of FAVIFA (Relatives of Victims 
of Violence in Argentinean Soccer), and the mother of Daniel, an 18-year-old boy killed in 
an ambush between barras in The Copa América 1995 (Chapietta, 2015: 55).
Salvemos al Fútbol has since provided legal advice to such victims (Murzi and Segura, 
2014), and also press releases and reports. These efforts have also stimulated the building 
of bridges with academics (Murzi et al., 2015). This article focuses on instances of vio-
lence since 2006 (the year when the NGO was created), producing eleven years of moni-
toring incidents in relation to soccer. We propose to analyze two specific aspects here: 
the frames of death; but, also, the cartography of actors, episodes and places involved. 
That is to say, we want to take into account the situations that potentially led to such 
fatalities. In other words, our specific objective is to present a mainly descriptive account 
of the problem. We expect, therefore, to contribute to the debate within the social sci-
ences around violent behavior in relation to the game in Argentina, and more broadly to 
the global understanding of violence and fandom. By doing so, we wish to provide tools 
for analyzing and, hopefully, re-designing public policies. Our research questions for 
that debate are: what forms have fatal soccer violence taken in Argentina? And which are 
the key profiles that appear in the current context? But, let us first review the existing 
studies to place our analysis in a historical context.
The studies of violence, barras, and soccer in Argentina
Argentinean soccer is underpinned by the National Football Association (AFA). There 
are two national divisions, the First League and the Second, called the National B. Below 
them are two parallel structures: on the one hand, the Metropolitan B, C, and D levels; 
and the Federal Championships A, B, and C on the other. Below these structures are the 
official regional leagues.
Argentinean soccer is characterized by the fervor of fans, locally called hinchas. 
Traditionally, there are two main categories of spectators: those who remain seated; and 
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those who stand collectively in the ends (la popular) of the stadium. It is in this latter 
sector that the hinchadas are found, that is, militant fans who provide permanent support. 
Barras consist of organized groups that control more than the aesthetic of hinchadas, as 
their profiles have evolved over the last decades. The press has named these groups as 
barras bravas (Conde, 2005), where the term bravas indicates, more than anything, that 
they are dangerous. Their members usually describe themselves as la Barra of their club 
(Garriga, 2006; Taddei, 2016), which is the term we will use.
We are of the opinion that although there is no unanimous definition around these 
terms, when we speak about barras today, we are referring, indeed, to organized groups 
of active supporters who, through their real and symbolic fervent support and their 
capacity to deploy violence, lead the activities of the hinchadas and at the same time 
maintain unstable relationships with actors from both the football world and other social 
and political channels. Nevertheless, barras do not comprise homogenous groups, since 
they are frequently divided into factions which struggle to control space and power. But, 
are the barras the only actors to produce violence related to soccer in Argentina?
Historical scenarios of violence
Skirmishes between fans, and aggression directed towards players and referees in 
Argentina can be traced to the first decades of the 20th century (Duke and Crolley, 2001; 
Frydemberg, 2012). Two identified deaths in 1922 are recorded. In 1924, one incident in 
Montevideo following the South American Cup ended with another death (Barnade and 
Iglesias, 2006). In 1939, police repression in the stadium of the Lanús club ended with two 
fans being killed. Five years later, the “episode of Gate 11” in the stadium of River Plate 
left seven dead by asphyxiation and several more injured. Subsequent casualties due to 
police repression occurred in 1955 and 1958, and added to those were the collapse of a 
bleacher at the Estudiantes stadium in 1959, when two spectators paid the ultimate price.
Romero (1985) attributed the increase of soccer violence to the political context in 
Argentina. In 1955 a coup d’état against Juan Domingo Perón took place and the Peronist 
party was banned for many years. It is in this context that the hinterland of soccer became 
a space for confrontations (Levinsky, 2016). Between 1958 and 1983, the number of 
injured people reached 4000 and those arrested and detained exceeded 5000 (Romero, 
1985: 10). In that respect, Archetti and Romero identified different scenarios for soccer 
deaths. The first was linked to brutal repression. Alberto Linker (18 years old) lost his 
life at the stadium of Velez in 1958 (Archetti and Romero, 1994: 16). The second involved 
violence between rival fans in 1967: Héctor Souto (15 years old) suffered the misfortune 
of defending a friend who celebrated a goal on the “wrong” side, where hard-core 
Huracan fans stood. This episode marked a new era. Spectators stopped circulating 
inside the stadium (Archetti and Romero, 1994: 26). Parenthetically, the 1968 Gate 12 
tragedy at the River Plate club where 71 fans of Boca Juniors died after being crushed at 
an exit, can be viewed in this context. Investigations indicated that supporters had had a 
previous fight with the police (Alabarces, 2004; Archetti and Romero, 1994).
The third profile of cases was linked to political persecution. In a game in La Plata in 
1976, the police shot Huracan supporters, who were considered leftist extremists 
(Romero, 1986: 74). The fourth scenario was the result of a planned confrontation 
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between Boca Junior’s organized fans and those of Quilmes, which ended with two 
deaths in 1983 (Archetti and Romero, 1994: 33). These analyses constituted the first 
systematic attempts to understand the increasing number of violent episodes. During the 
following decades, social scientists in Argentina, many of them inspired by Archetti and 
Romero, continued to propose approaches for analyzing such events.
Aesthetics of violence: Between carnival and dispositions for struggles
Some academics have stressed the symbolic meanings of confrontations during the 1990s. 
This, in the native jargon, came under the banner of possessing “aguante”—a form of 
“standing before one’s enemies” (Alabarces, 2004). In an analogy to early interpretations 
of aggro and hooliganism as ritualized aggression (Marsh, 1978), this involved organized 
groups walking into rival neighborhoods when travelling to a stadium, singing and dis-
playing their body capital. Similar to the old soccer “firms” in England (Dunning et al., 
1986; Hobbs and Robin, 1991; Readhead, 1991), a series of studies have proved how past 
soccer battles can provide prestige for able performers (Aragón, 2007; Garriga, 2006).
The thefts of “trophies”—flags, drums, and standards—have remained part of this 
folklore for many years (Moreira, 2005). The construction of male identities has repro-
duced such practices (Cabrera, 2013; Czesli, 2013; Gaffney 2009; Gil, 2007) and the 
“carnival” climate of Argentinean soccer (Archetti, 1992) was often imitated in other 
countries (Carrión, 2014; Castro, 2013; Hollanda, 2017; Segura-Trejo, 2013). This can 
be explained by fan fervor and their capacity to produce multiple chants—cantitos 
(Gandara, 1997; Parrish and Nauright, 2013)—using musical instruments and colorful 
decorations. However, deadly threats have also been made explicit in many chants: “I 
want the Libertadores [Cup] and [to] kill a hen,” is usually sung by Boca Juniors fans 
when referring to their peers at River Plate, who reply that they will happily kill rival 
“bosteros.”
Battles against police have been a source of the most “positive” fan reputations in this 
micro-cosmos (Aragón, 2007). These confrontations have nourished reciprocal codes, to 
a point where the police are perceived, by many fans, as a third-enemy (Galvani and 
Palma, 2005). As regards the state’s response, several laws and norms have reinforced 
repressive measures (Godio and Uliana, 2016; Sustas, 2013), but no substantial preven-
tive alternatives have been implemented (Segura and Murzi, 2015). The statistics gath-
ered by Salvemos have detailed that 22% of the fan deaths between 1966 and 2012 were 
due to police repression (Murzi et al., 2015). Security perimeter fences were conceived 
of as part of military operations to separate rival fans (Taddei, 2016; Uliana and Godio, 
2013). Nevertheless, prominent groups and individuals belonging to barras learned to 
reach agreements with the local police in order to negotiate relationships (Bergés, 2015). 
When negotiations have failed, the balance has been broken by one of the parties, a way 
of “passing the bill” on to the other (Garriga et al., 2017).
Internal disputes in the new Millennium
Existing studies have proved how officials have nourished relationships with groups of 
barras, either for support when running for the club presidency or for intimidation of 
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adversaries (Duke and Crolley, 2001; Moreira, 2012; Sain and Rodríguez, 2014). But not 
everything has remained at the level of masculine ritual. Organized groups act now as 
complex networks (Bundio, 2013), with a range of connections (Bergés, 2015; D’Angelo, 
2012) and endowed with survivalist instincts. A new issue has made a breakthrough dur-
ing the decade of 2000–2010: killings within the same stand of the fan group. From the 
list of soccer deaths, it can be observed that between 2000 and 2012, out of the 77 cases, 
36% were caused by internal fan struggles (Segura-Trejo, 2013: 33). One of the main 
reasons can be attributed to disputes over power (Murzi, 2011) and the individualistic 
interests of leaders, in harmony with neoliberal trends which have permeated fan cul-
tures, from the general levels of corruption in the country’s political and civic spheres to 
the world of soccer (Aragón, 2017). The quarrels can be interpreted then, in Bourdieu’s 
terms (1981), as struggles for the “field.” In effect, each barra is at an apex of tensile 
equality which may be disrupted every time one faction wants to relegate the other(s). 
This occurs in huge clubs such as Boca Juniors, River Plate, Racing, San Lorenzo, or 
Independiente, in mid-range clubs, but also in clubs of lower rank.
The press constitutes another crucial actor since, although it claims to talk about “the 
facts,” “violence” is also used as a commodity in media reports (Szlifman, 2010). The 
hegemonic media tend to stress that barras-bravas represent the core of the problem. 
Nonetheless, social scientists have suggested a broader interpretation of the prevailing 
atmosphere of violence (Sodo, 2013). It is in this direction that our contribution focuses; 
more specifically, in the years between 2006 and 2017 we have investigated actors 
involved in violent incidents, and both the place and nature of such disputes. How can we 
interpret these episodes? Here, we risk general hypotheses. Far from being contained, 
new frames of death and disorder have marked a different direction for Argentinean soc-
cer culture during the last decades. Four specific hypotheses are proposed.
1. There has been an increase in the economic sources of disputes among members 
of barras.
2. Public policies aimed at prohibiting visiting fans have contributed to exacerbat-
ing internal conflicts.
3. Contrary to earlier decades when problems happened inside or around the sta-
dium, a growing number of episodes are taking place far from soccer’s venues.
4. Collective incidents, involving actors other than barras, often occur due to disa-
greements about results, adding more negative ingredients to the atmosphere, 
especially in lower leagues and youth-leagues.
We suggest these hypotheses are up for debate by providing below a sample of repre-
sentative scenarios of incidents around the Argentinean game.
A note on methodology
The second and third authors are directly related to Salvemos, and the first author is an 
academic collaborator with no formal position. When the National Direction of Security 
in Sport Events approached Salvemos in the beginning of 2016, the fact that they asked 
for statistics about violence in soccer confirmed that there was no official data collected 
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by the national state. The authors of this article realized the need to construct information 
to inform public policies and, more widely, to update the research reviewed above.
Salvemos has continued the listing of soccer-related incidents and deaths in Argentina 
initiated by Romero (1986). For this specific piece of research, an important part of the 
material gathered comes from the follow-up accounts of violent events reported by the 
press, complemented by the reports from the NGO. After much collaboration, the authors 
decided during the first months of 2016 to make a database to classify these files and to 
produce a more systematic approach to monitoring and collating data.
However, we had to define, firstly, what was understood by “violence” and, secondly, 
how it should be treated. As there was no official available data, we decided to record 
examples of obvious physical aggression and also serious threats to integrity and prop-
erty. Our single source for the constructed database comes from the online press.1 This 
constitutes a serious limitation, one that we will comment more on in the discussion 
section.
We need to state here that our conception of violence does not cover the whole spec-
trum of soccer-related incidents. Political, institutional, economic, and cultural expres-
sions are also part of the phenomenon. But physical harm can be the direct consequence 
of other forms of behavior. For instance, during a South American club semi-final, the 
authors observed a father, with his baby in his arms, aggressively singing about how the 
barra of his team had embarrassed and outraged their biggest rivals. But we could not 
consider here, for methodological reasons, verbal violence in fan chants.
To complete our database, between August 2006 and July 2017, we proceeded to a 
more systematic Internet search by using keywords such as violencia—fútbol—violencia 
en el fútbol, to discern specific incidents. We are able to present, then, some representa-
tive accounts and summary statistics as regards: yearly trends; episodes related (or unre-
lated) to matches; characteristics of the actors involved; and consequences for clubs and 
leagues. In order to test the hypotheses proposed above, we considered incidents at soc-
cer championships under the aegis of the AFA from official divisions, but also those at 
senior youth-leagues.
The picture of violence
The Internet search revealed a total of n = 651 episodes, that is, where physical aggres-
sion or serious actions aimed at injuring was identified, between August 2006 and July 
2017. Deaths occurred in 98 of these incidents, which represent 15% of our sample and 
an average of nine deaths per year.
An important finding shows that 153 cases of violent aggression were aimed at soccer 
players, coaches, officials or referees during this period (27% of the total sample). 
However, if one examines the data in Table 1 it is also possible to observe the growth of 
violent struggles amongst groups from the same club, reaching 24% of all aggressions. 
Moreover, these internal fan conflicts are confirmed as being the leading cause of soccer-
related deaths (51%).
Violence between rival fans, which could have been expected in previous decades and 
which in most European countries continues to be the most relevant problem (Dunning 
et al., 1986; Spaiij, 2006; Tsoukala, 2009), now appears on the secondary stage in 
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Argentina, accounting for 19% of violent incidents, but 32% of all fan deaths. 
Confrontations between supporters and police account for 14% of violent incidents 
found in the press, as reported in Table 1. Other types of categories, with lower represen-
tation, include: serious material destruction (i.e., cars, shops or club facilities damaged as 
the result of violent acts); aggression between protagonists of the game, where soccer 
players or/and staff are the ones involved in battles; and finally, “tragic” accidents, where 
fans may have fallen from the stands, or from a train or bus.
Barras-bravas were held accountable by the press as the actors to blame in these 
incidents in 63% of the cases, either because of fights between rival fans, or against the 
police, or among supporters’ factions. This means that, although barras do indeed con-
stitute relevant participants, in 37% of all episodes, other actors were found to be culpa-
ble, including fans with no evident relation to barras. Additionally, sitting spectators 
(usually assumed to be non-violent actors) appeared culpable in one-in-12 (8%) of all 
incidents.
There were situations where the leading groups could not be easily identified by 
media reports, but it was possible to identity violence produced by groups of supporters. 
Thus, 66% of the episodes are attributable to disputes in relation to the staging of the 
“soccer-show”: that is, inside the security perimeter of stadium, or on the way to it, 
whilst 34% happened in scenarios with no obvious links to matches, sometimes on days 
when there were no games played at all.
But what types of serious incidents are we discussing here and who is, in fact, 
involved? For representative purposes, we have focused on different (but typical) 
scenarios.
Table 1. Trends of reported violent episodes in soccer, 2006–2017.
Categories Years 
2006–2009
Years 
2010–2013
Years 
2014–2017
Percentage 
episodes (100%)
Deaths 
and %
Aggression and violence 
among fans of same team
38 56 59 n = 153 (24%) n = 50
51%
Aggression and violence 
aimed at players, coaches, 
referees and officials
16 44 116 n = 175 (27%) n = 1
1%
Aggression and violence 
between rival fan groups
39 45 42 n = 126
(19%)
n = 32
32%
Incidents between police 
and fans
15 29 47 n = 91
(14%)
n = 6
6%
Instances of serious 
material damage
8 20 21 n = 49
(7%)
–
Incidents of collective 
aggression between 
soccer players and staff
4 12 25 n = 41
(6%)
n = 2
2%
“Tragic” accidents – 3 12 n = 15
(2%)
n = 6
6%
Total n = 120 n = 209 n = 322 n = 651 n = 98
Source: Compiled by the authors.
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Intra-group struggles between peers from the same stand
The case of the barra of River Plate, nominated as The Drunks of the Stands (Los 
Borrachos) may be illustrative of the growing internal struggles in Argentinean fan cul-
ture. During the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) 2006 World 
Cup, the leaders of the Borrachos were seen on television (TV) encouraging the national 
team. (Since the 1980s, several leaders of the barras had the tradition of travelling to the 
World Cup finals, similar to the patterns of their English rivals (Williams et al., 1984).) 
A year later, in 2007, a prominent member of the River Plate’s barra, Gonzalo Acro, was 
murdered while he was leaving his gym far from the stadium.
After his death, competition for the command of the barra began to occur as an 
expanded pattern of interventions. These positions represent a valued source of contacts, 
revenue from transactions and services, as well as becoming businesses in their own 
right. Among the first-named, for example, are useful connections for formal and infor-
mal jobs, in unions and the municipalities (Garriga, 2006; Moreira, 2012), and for roles 
as drivers, bodyguards, and security personnel at demonstrations and shows. Among the 
last-named are the control of parking lots adjacent to match venues, food sales, the com-
mercialization of narcotic sales outside, and sometimes inside, the stands together with 
the informal “agreements” made with the local police about “soccer business” (Garriga 
et al., 2017).
These cases showed that barra leaders were not always marginal figures. Acro also 
belonged to a group of regular club members who frequented the club, swimming pools, 
gymnasiums, volleyball pitches, and restaurants. In addition, he boasted a certain level 
of style and etiquette, as Hobbs and Robin (1991) have described being common among 
renowned leaders of hooligan firms in England in the late 1980s. The possible “causes” 
of the murder pointed to disputes between factions including, possibly, those over per-
centage “fees” allegedly owed for the transfers of soccer players (Murzi, 2011). 
Aggression continued after the death of Acro in different scenarios. In 2008, two factions 
of the River Plate’s barra clashed in the stadium of the Velez club, resulting in many 
injured. In 2010, another River Plate fan, Jonathan Waldmeier, died after a shooting on 
his way to the stadium.
In fact, the response of the clubs and the forces of order tended to officially recognize 
factions capable of imposing their presence, either by the victory over competitors, or by 
negotiating agreements. Primary access to the stadium for the winning group—called the 
official Barra—reduced the other(s) to a double status of marginal(s). This situation has 
been the subject of multiple disputes where groups seek to preserve, or otherwise re-
conquer, space. As an example, the cafeteria of River Plate was taken in an assault by one 
dissident faction in 2014, with the intention of “teaching a lesson” to the official 
leaders.
The distribution of benefits, as well as the prestige of occupying a central place in the 
stadium, correlated with the upsurge of internal disputes: two deaths linked to factions of 
Huracán in 2009, when the team failed to become national champions, may serve as 
another example. Inner struggles for control left 10 fans dead in 2010. Pimpi Caminos, 
the leader of the stand in Newell’s club, was murdered due to disputes over territories 
(Del Frade, 2008). One militant journalist, Nicolas Pacheco, was found dead in the 
swimming-pool of the Racing Club in January 2013. A couple of members of one faction 
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aspiring to control the barra were present at the scene. This inventory also includes a 
huge battle between factions of Boca Juniors near the stadium of San Lorenzo in July 
2013; the consequences were two individuals shot to death.
The height of these intra-group factional confrontations and the general ethos of vio-
lence (Archetti, 1992), was illustrated in May 2015 in a game for the Copa Libertadores 
between Boca Juniors and River Plate. Despite the fact there were no visiting fans 
allowed, dissident fan groups united to harm those in power and attacked the players of 
River Plate with pepper spray. After that, ordinary spectators threw bottles of water to the 
River Plate players, who refused to continue playing.
In smaller clubs with more suburban characteristics, clandestine economics, political 
ties and tensions in the neighborhoods can explain a great deal about clashes. Images on 
TV captured a tremendous battle in 2013 between factions—with different political 
links—in the stadium of Quilmes, and the fatal shooting of an Almirante Brown sup-
porter, killed by his peers in 2014. This list goes on—such as in Nueva Chicago, and 
those clubs between the 3rd and 4th Divisions, such as Ituizaingó, Berazategui, or the 
followers of Antonio Guarani Franco, from the northern province of Misiones, among 
many other examples.
It is also worth noticing that non-football businesses, like the market la Salada, make 
commitments to different fan groups (some of them identified with Boca Juniors, Los 
Andes, Lanús, Temperley, and River Plate) in connection with political authorities. These 
elements can give the impression that violent disputes are produced only between the 
famous barras groups. Illustrating other sources of conflict, in April 2017, Emmanuel 
Balbo, a young amateur from Belgrano de Córdoba, was brutally beaten in the stadium. 
Balbo had had an argument with another fan because of conflicts related to his family. 
The latter began to (falsely) accuse Balbo of being a fan of Talleres de Córdoba. Balbo 
was thrown into the empty space below a sector without the involvement of the barra. 
He died later in hospital. But despite deaths among peers, conflicts between rival fans in 
Argentina have not remained latent.
Confrontations among rival fans
The death of Marcelo Cejas, a fan of Tigre who was hit by a stone after an attack by 
Nueva Chicago’s supporters, constitutes an illustration of the hate and intolerance which 
is often expressed towards rival clubs’ fans. The game was the defining moment before 
the promotion in 2007 of one team (Tigre) to the First League or the survival of the other 
(Chicago) in the top division. This episode marked the commencement of prohibition of 
visitors for games in the National B league.
Territorial confrontations in local derbies were frequent in several provinces during 
this period, such as in Tucumán, Salta, Mendoza, Córdoba, and Santa Fe. In 2008, the 
First League saw the deaths of Rodrigo Silvera, a supporter of Huracan shot by the barra 
of San Lorenzo, and Emanuel Alvarez, a supporter of Velez, also shot on his way to the 
stadium. The practice of confronting rival fans based on notions of honor and reputation 
(Aragón, 2007; Garriga, 2006; Moreira, 2005) has been present in different scenarios, 
with a high percentage of deaths, as shown in Table 1. The barras of Racing and Gimnasia 
de la Plata, former allies, had a clash near a train station in December 2010. A young 
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man, Maximiliano Goñi, was shot. As the reader may notice by now, organized fan 
groups have adopted the habit of moving to the stadiums with firearms—almost unheard 
of in the European context where honor is about non-fatal domination, usually by fists. 
In that sense, the segregation of the visiting public is a means of avoiding the urban dis-
placements of rivals in Argentina.
Beginning in 2013, supporters from different clubs were not allowed to meet anymore 
in the stadium, but fierce episodes were intensifying in local neighborhoods. The city of 
Rosario witnessed repeated clashes of supporters of Newell’s and Rosario Central. In 
December 2013, a group of supporters of Newell’s was leaving the stadium in a van and 
an argument broke out with two individuals on a motorcycle, one of whom was wearing 
a T-shirt of Rosario Central. Inevitably, it seems, the van was attacked a few blocks 
away. Two fans, Leonardo Boladian and Walter Palacio were killed, and a woman and 
her seven-year old daughter were severely wounded. The NGO Salvemos, through its 
president Mariano Bergés, provided legal advice to the victims. One offender was con-
demned in 2017 to 30 years in jail. In November 2014, two fans of San Telmo (4th 
Division) were fatally shot by neighbors from Dock Sud in peripheral streets because of 
mutual provocation.
An attempt to allow fans of the visiting team in the stadium again took place at the 
beginning of 2017. But the year started badly, with a supporter of Lanús already dead. 
Leonardo Yanis fell when his bus was attacked with stones thrown from a neighborhood 
street on his way to the stadium of La Plata. Moreover, scenes of high tension were 
noted, weeks after, between local police and the fans of River Plate on their arrival at 
Lanús.
Confrontations with police
Clashes of fans with police have been a historical fact of Argentinean football (Archetti 
and Romero, 1994) and the source of a constant number of deaths (Murzi et al., 2015). 
Police forces have regularly provoked confrontations (Alabarces, 2004; Galvani and 
Palma, 2005; Taddei, 2016). In this climate, high-risk games involve the payment of 
hefty police overtime and more police personnel being hired, along with the develop-
ment of more sophisticated police operations (Uliana and Godio, 2013). But the Barra 
may still have the privilege of access due to arrangements made with the local police 
district (Garriga et al., 2017). However, away games are more complicated, where the 
distant venues are guarded by rivals and by hostile forces of law and order.
After the death of Ramón Aramayo, an ordinary San Lorenzo supporter, during a 
security check before a match in the Velez stadium in 2012, the police force found itself 
in the eye of the storm. In addition, the fierce police repression of Lanús’ fans in La Plata 
in June 2013 caused the death of Martin Jerez. This episode led the provincial authorities 
to ban visitors, with the expectation that this might reduce violence. This measure did not 
take into account, however, the increased occurrence of confrontations among factions 
of the same fan squads. It can be difficult to clarify the facts when excesses are commit-
ted by agents of the state, but the opposite scenario has also occurred.
For example, in the stadium of Laferrere (4th Division) in March 2015, the police 
were assaulted when they tried to prevent 200 militant fans entering the stadium by 
12 International Review for the Sociology of Sport 00(0)
force. Two police officers were severely injured, including one who required transport to 
hospital by a rescue helicopter. The clashes continued the following day, as police 
returned to a neighborhood to recover a stolen rifle—actions all worthy perhaps of urban 
guerrilla warfare. As shown in Table 1, confrontations with the police are a definite fac-
tor when analyzing fan violence in the soccer setting. And, there is another, additional, 
scenario of violence to consider: aggression towards and between participants of the 
matches.
Aggression involving protagonists, officials, and battles on the field
Aggression towards players and referees was a frequent fact at Argentinean soccer in the 
early 20th century (Frydemberg, 2012). The question is: who executes such aggression 
today? And the answer is: we are faced with a number of actors and situations. In 2011, 
members of the official barra of River Plate entered into the field in a relegation match, 
intimidating their own players. One week later, members of the same group tried to 
attack the referee, when their club was, inevitably, falling into the 2nd Division. For bet-
ter sporting results, greater resources are at stake and vice versa (Murzi, 2011). In fact, 
several soccer players and referees were attacked during these years of study and the list 
includes more than 30 clubs where this has happened. In 2013, in the regional league of 
La Rioja, Franco Nieto, a local player, was hit by a stone and died.
As part of the consequences of the factional struggles described here, any threat to 
acquired privileges can lead to aggression towards club officials. Javier Cantero, presi-
dent of Independiente de Avellenada (2011–2014) who openly challenged the interests of 
the Barra, was constantly threatened. In October 2013, the (female) president of Yupanqui 
(5th Division), Lilian Machado, had to hide in an office and wait for the police when a 
group of fans tried to attack her. The president of Temperley (1st Division), Hernan 
Lewin, resigned in 2016 because of deadly threats. Such threats have also affected other 
officials, coaches and players.
Nonetheless, as we have been emphasizing, barras are not the only actors to produce 
such violence. A Lanús player, Matías Fritzler, was attacked by an ordinary supporter 
when talking to the press after a defeat in 2015. Seated spectators threw objects at players 
and referees on repeated occasions in different stadiums, including at San Lorenzo, Velez, 
Rosario Central, Boca Juniors, and Douglas Haig, among others. In 2015, the coach of 
Quilmes was threatened by one supporter who dared to insult him. Several scenarios of 
“spontaneous violence” (Walgrave and Limbergen, 1988) were also registered in regional 
leagues (5th–8th Divisions). The facts were mostly similar: a sending off, a penalty or a 
defeat unleashed violence between rival fans (organized and ordinary) and/or players. 
The capacities of the police forces have not been sufficient to contain such incidents, but 
they often do participate in the action.
Collective fights in the field have occurred periodically, as was the case of Gimnasia 
and Estudiantes during the summer of 2016. In youth tournaments, violence among play-
ers, staff and even relatives have taken on a larger scale. Emiliano Monti, a goalkeeper 
in a regional league, lost his life in November 2013 after a beating by his opponents in 
July of that year. In September 2015, Matias Minanfra, a young player (16 years old) of 
the lower division club of All Boys was beaten with a stone as a consequence of a mass 
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pitch fight with players of Chacarita, and their relatives and friends. In March 2017, 
Fernando Pereiras, a coach of indoor-soccer, died in a hospital after being beaten by the 
uncle of a player.
Battles in indoor-soccer have been frequent among soccer participants and spectators 
at the same scene. There are also situations where members of barras have appeared, 
either accompanying their children or to be involved in quarrels against opponents (play-
ers or supporters). As we can infer from these scenarios, serious (sometimes fatal) vio-
lence at different levels of soccer in Argentina is not exclusive to one particular group or 
club.
Discussion and some conclusions
First, we reflect on the general climate of violence that surrounds Argentinean soccer. 
Besides the spectacular atmosphere, aesthetics, chants and support of fans, masculine 
aggressiveness (Dunning et al., 1986) permanently sets the stage for violence, both out-
side and inside the field.
From those early frameworks identified by Archetti and Romero, when the hard core 
barras and the systemic logics of violence first took root, subsequent studies have identi-
fied different features. Although barras can be marginalized, their new capacity has 
made their older members socially integrated into clubs, unions, and political parties 
(D’Angelo, 2012; Garriga, 2006; Moreira, 2012; Murzi, 2011). Some leaders have even 
established contacts within higher political spheres (Bergés, 2015), showing that the 
focus by the press and authorities on individuals may not bring solutions.
In relation to the data presented here, the fact we had to interpret the view of the press 
has demanded some subjective analysis. Today, the sole national sports newspaper in 
Argentina, Olé, has a fixed section dedicated to violence. These data do not always con-
stitute incidents, but just the daily activity of a barra-brava, demonstrating that for part 
of the press, there is an automatic metonymy between barras-bravas and violence. The 
mass media has collapsed “violence and soccer” into a regularly featured news item, and 
there is even a radio program dedicated to talk about barras on a weekly basis.
The compilation of episodes of violence is also a complex task, due to the large number 
of games that take place in Argentina, and the fact that not all of them have press cover-
age. Therefore, the compilation here only involved those events that attracted media atten-
tion, which a priori generates an over-representation of most important matches and 
teams. Despite the fact that our investigations attempted to identify a comprehensive set 
of data, another unavoidable limitation came from the scarce news we get from regional, 
amateur or little leagues, where protagonists can be severely injured in confrontations.
We can infer, however, that the use of violence suggests that physical assaults and 
intimidation, some of which result in deaths, are socially enacted. In relation to the pro-
posed hypotheses, the growing intra-factional conflicts result in a number of violent 
incidents and deaths. The biggest enemy—the “other”—is no longer, and always, in the 
opposite stand; he may be trying to occupy positions in the same end. In that sense, we 
are faced with planned internal battles.
As regards the second hypothesis, the banning of visiting fans in the stadium adds 
motives for disputing power with peers of the same stand. Furthermore, as different 
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studies have shown (Alabarces, 2004; Aragón, 2007; Galvani and Palma, 2005; Garriga 
et al., 2017; Sain and Rodríguez, 2014; Uliana and Godio, 2013), the transformation of 
the way in which the forces of law and order deal with soccer is one of the facets that 
needs to be reconsidered. As Taddei (2016) asserts, there is a general state of neurosis 
between police and fans. Nonetheless, the press may not register episodes when law 
enforcement officers commit “minor” excesses, and the police tend not to bring them to 
light. This explains the relatively small number of incidents with the police shown in 
Table 1.
Despite a significant number of episodes identified far from the venues, we cannot 
sustain the third hypothesis categorically. Several brutal confrontations between fans 
from the same stand have been settled inside the stadium, as happened in 2009 in Colon 
of Santa Fe or near its perimeter, or at Quilmes, River Plate, Boca Juniors, Newell’s, 
Nueva Chicago, Almirante Brown, and Huracan, among others. In addition, some “exe-
cutions” clearly exceed the soccer setting. In October of 2010, for example, a demonstra-
tor, Mariano Ferreyra, was killed in a railroad union protest. The assassin was a member 
of the barra of Defensa y Justicia and was presumably hired by heads of the railroad 
service.
Equally worrying, collective violence involving other actors is often unleashed due to 
disagreements about decisions and sporting results. These episodes infer that the sport-
performance factor should not be abandoned as one of the explanations for violence. We 
need to distinguish two main features in this vein: when supporters physically attack, 
intimidate or throw objects at their own players, or any figure of authority, on the one 
hand; and other scenarios involving players and their relatives in youth leagues and 
indoor-soccer, on the other. In these acts of contempt for “the other,” aggression may also 
lead to deaths.
In short, and contrary to hegemonic mass media interpretations, which consider bar-
ras-bravas as the “cancer” to be extirpated, one of the conclusions of this research is that 
soccer violence is also committed by other actors. Although it is difficult to prove, there 
is no such a thing as a violent sector per se on one side and a non-violent society, with 
puritan actors, on the other. Consequently, victims and the context of their lives, is 
another dimension that requires more attention. Of course, in this investigation we have 
dealt with only part of the problem. We have tried to find different frames using the sug-
gested hypotheses and through the data gathered, but we recognize a need to propose 
other hypotheses and identify scenarios with complex combinations of elements, some 
of which have been described separately. Other identifiable patterns may emerge with 
more sustained research.
Soccer is part of the history of Argentina and has constituted a ‘micro-society’ that 
reproduces wider problems. Violence is not a homogeneous phenomenon, since a variety 
of situations and different modus operandi are clearly at work. According to Aragón 
(2017), the micro-cosmos of barras-bravas reflects bigger neoliberal logics that have 
existed over many decades in the country. In a context where survival is a challenge 
based on individual and unethical merits, the competition which has exacerbated prob-
lems among groups and leaders on the same side may be only a reproduction of wider 
features of economic, political, and social life. When FIFA’s scandals exploded in 2015, 
several individuals and companies involved were operating in connection with Argentina. 
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Therein, there are other problems that deserve attention, such as the possible links 
between corporate corruption and the upsurge of factional disputes.
Finally, studies have pointed, without much success, to the need for stronger mecha-
nisms for violence prevention and to the imperative to celebrate passion but reject vio-
lence. Despite the neurotic media attention on incidents involving fans, especially 
barras-bravas, rhetorical discourses and official announcements to “eradicate violence” 
have proved ineffective. It is time, perhaps, to give voice to ordinary fans. After all, they 
may propose useful alternatives.
New civil associations are forming, including a national coordination of fans 
(Coordinadora de Hinchas). Beginning in 2009, Salvemos launched a proposal (never 
implemented by the authorities): instead of separating and banning fans, the idea is to 
create mixed spaces for fans of different clubs, a way to demonstrate that supporters are 
not violent per se and can interact peacefully with each other. This would only be a start-
ing point to transform understanding and meanings. Through this research, we hope to 
present a stimulus for further discussions, for academic studies, but also for crucial pub-
lic policy debate.
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Note
1. Online sources consulted: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/; http://www.ole.com.ar/; http://www.
clarin.com/; http://www.tiempoar.com.ar/; https://www.pagina12.com.ar/; http://www.telam.
com.ar/; http://www.cronica.com.ar/; http://442.perfil.com/; http://www.minutouno.com; 
http://www.infobae.com/america/; In order to report incidents from the inferior divisions, the 
specialized website http://www.soloascenso.com.ar/ was periodically accessed. Furthermore, 
to reduce the unavoidable over-representation skewed to the economic and social concentra-
tion around Buenos Aires and surroundings, sites from other cities and provinces were con-
sulted, among them: http://www.eldia.com/; http://www.lacapital.com.ar/; www.rosarioplus.
com; http://www.lagaceta.com.ar/; http://www.lavoz.com.ar/; www.jujuyaldia.com.ar
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